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Arbitrating the Israeli-Palestinian Territorial Dispute: A Riposte 
In an insightful and original article Asaf Siniver argues that the current formula for resolving the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict—bi-lateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians backed by US 
mediation—has been exhausted. Arbitration, he contends, should replace the now defunct 
framework for negotiations. It would serve not only to solve the territorial dispute between Israel 
and the Palestinians over the West Bank, but might also create the momentum required to 
conclude a binding agreement on other important issues: e.g., Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian 
refugees, and the settlements. New ways of thinking about how to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict are to be welcomed, but the notion that arbitration could serve as the way forward 
seems flawed.  
 
First, Siniver’s argument is based on an incorrect presentation of the successful arbitration 
process between Israel and the Egypt over Taba, as a precedent for resolving the dispute 
between Israel and the Palestinians over the West Bank. Israel and Egypt entered the 
arbitration process over Taba in 1986, after signing and implementing their peace agreement. 
This involved Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula bar the Taba area. In 1986 the peace 
process had proved resilient to several formidable challenges: the assassination of President 
Anwar Sadat, who initiated the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, and the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon. The arbitration process was completed in 1988, by which time the Israeli-Egyptian 
peace process had survived a third challenge: eruption of the first Palestinian Intifada. Thus, 
arbitration as a tool for conflict resolution in the Israeli-Egyptian context was introduced only 
after peace – albeit a cold peace - between the two countries had become an established fact.   
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By contrast, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations neither yielded nor implemented a peace 
agreement. They resulted in interim agreements (1993, 1994, 1995), which were partially 
implemented, were subject to much dispute, and were renegotiated, for instance, in the Wye 
Summit (1998). Also, the Israeli-Palestinian process has not proven resilient to challenges 
similar to those that tested the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, for example, assassination of 
Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Thus, an analogy between arbitration over Taba and 
resolution of the dispute over the West Bank is unwarranted. Siniver correctly reminds us that 
efforts at mediation should be located in their specific temporal and spatial contexts and judged 
accordingly. The same should apply to analogies between past attempts at arbitration and its 
potential contemporary utility.  
 
The false analogy between arbitration over Taba, and the West Bank is not the only problem 
with applying an arbitration mechanism to resolving the territorial dispute over the West Bank. 
Another and possibly more crucial problem derives from the notion that good faith between 
parties is a precondition for entering arbitration, let alone implementing it. Yet, surely, one of the 
key factors that has prolonged negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians - for almost two 
decades - is precisely the lack of good faith between the two sides. With the possible exception 
of the two years (1993-1995) before Rabin was assassinated, lack of good faith has marked 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The question that arises then, is how, in the 
absence of good faith, could arbitration, which is predicated on good faith, prove useful for 
resolving a dispute over the deeply contested territory of the West Bank, or even parts of it? 
Unless the process of arbitration creates good faith between two sides, which would seem not 
to be the case here, it will be doomed from the outset.  
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A further problem is the legal complications that would be involved were arbitration to be used to 
resolve the territorial dispute over the West Bank, or even as a sympathetic framework for 
settlement. As Siniver points out, when Israel and Egypt embarked on the arbitration process in 
1986, they were in agreement that ‘the border between the two countries was to be demarcated 
along the recognized international border between Egypt and the former mandated territory of 
Palestine’. Thus, the legal status of the territory was not disputed, only the location of the 
border. However, Israel and the Palestinians do not have a common view about the legal status 
of the West Bank. The Palestinians contend that the West Bank is under occupation and that 
Israeli settlements are illegal. Israel, on the other hand, claims that the West Bank was not 
seized from a ‘recognized sovereign’, but was secured in a war of self defence against Jordan, 
whose seizure of the West Bank in 1948 was never recognized by the international community. 
Israel argues that since the West Bank did not have a legitimate sovereign, under international 
law it could not be considered occupied but rather a disputed territory.1 Given the current 
nationalistic political trends in Israel Siniver correctly identifies, and the increasing 
rapprochement between Hamas and Fatah, it would seem extremely unlikely that Israel and the 
Palestinians could agree a common international legal definition of the West Bank. If the two 
sides involved in the potential arbitration cannot agree on this most basic feature of the legal 
status of the territory being disputed, on what basis could they proceed towards arbitration?  
 
What else might break the current deadlock in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? The case for 
arbitration is based on the notion that mediation is the weakest link in the current peace 
negotiation formula. However, the current stalemate could be explained not in terms of 
ineffective mediation, but as testament to the shortcomings of negotiations premised on bi-
lateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Clearly, as the past 20 years have shown, the 
                                                          
1
 http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2003/11/Israel-%20the%20Conflict%20and%20Peace-
%20Answers%20to%20Frequen, accessed, 12 Jan, 2012.  
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two sides cannot resolve the conflict by themselves. This, and not mediation, is the key problem 
with the current framework.  
 
In 2002 the Arab League adopted a formula designed to shift Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
from a bi-lateral to a multi-lateral track process. The Arab Peace Initiative (API), as it is known, 
demands that Israel withdraw fully from the territories seized in the 1967 war and agree to the 
establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, with East Jerusalem as its capital. It 
stipulates also that the Palestinian refugee problem should be resolved in accordance with UN Resolution 
194, which states that Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date. In return, the Arab states will 
consider the Arab-Israeli conflict to be at an end, and relations with Israel will be normalized. The API 
offers clear advantages for key players in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Saudi Arabia which first 
proposed the deal in 2002. For Israel it provides a viable political framework for a resumption of the 
Arab-Israeli peace process and the normalization of relations that Israel so craves. For the Palestinians, 
the API constitutes a crucial contribution to help compensate for the fragility of their current political 
system given the conflicts between Fatah and Hamas in recent years, which have jeopardized any 
prospects for achieving statehood for some time to come. For Saudi Arabia, the API is a political tool that 
can be used to curtail Iran’s growing political and military power across the Middle East since the 
invasion of Iraq. This convergence of interest in the API—emanating from different motivations—could 
create the conditions for a meaningful revival of the Arab-Israeli peace process backed by US mediation.   
 
Of course, there are a number of formidable obstacles to the API. One source of difficulty is Hamas’s 
refusal to meet the three basic requirements of the Quartet—renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and 
respecting previously signed agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). However, 
previous statements by the head of the movement’s political bureau, Khaled Mashal, suggest that 
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Hamas’s stance could change,2 especially if backed by the Arab League. The stipulation that the 
Palestinian refugee problem should be resolved in accordance with UN resolution 194 constitutes another 
problem. This proposed solution is incompatible with Israel remaining a Jewish and democratic state, and 
is not politically, economically or socially viable to allow all refugees, and three generations of their 
offspring, into Israel. Yet the API terminology on this issue is sufficiently vague to allow compromise 
should this be political objective of the two sides. However, the most significant hurdle is the uncertainty 
created by the Arab uprisings, especially the turmoil in Syria. This process may or may not create more 
auspicious conditions for a re-launching of the API: it is too soon to tell. But if conditions become 
favorable, the international community should grasp this important opportunity rather than ignoring it as 
it has done since 2002.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Abbas: Hamas agreed to renounce terror, Ynet, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4162912,00.html, 
accessed 12 January, 2012.  
